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321 
On Aiding Technological Development: 
The Max Planck Declaration on Patent 
Protection 
Rochelle Dreyfuss* and Esteban Donoso** 
The Declaration on Patent Protection is a welcome addition to the 
Max Planck Institute’s work on the flexibilities available under the 
TRIPS Agreement. Like the previously published Copyright Declaration, 
it improves on the World Trade Organization’s interpretations of the 
open-ended, three-part exceptions provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Furthermore, it attempts to clarify the other regulatory options that are 
retained under TRIPS. Here, we contend, the Declaration makes three 
mistakes. First, its aggressive interpretations of certain provisions 
undermine its credibility, making it a less useful resource than a document 
prepared by such notable scholars might be. Second, the options, if adopted 
in toto, would significantly undermine incentives to invent. Yet the 
Declaration does not provide guidance on which options a state that is 
intent on encouraging innovation should adopt. Third, the Declaration’s 
focus on the provisions in TRIPS that maintain sovereign regulatory 
authority misses the Agreement’s failure to coordinate the global 
innovation enterprise. We argue that two dramatic revisions to TRIPS—
a change in the term of patent protection and a rule on international 
exhaustion—would provide countries with more freedom to experiment 
with the flexibilities correctly identified by the Declaration. These changes 
would also ensure that each country contributes a proportionate share to 
the costs of global innovation. And they might also lead nations to 
entertain the idea of abandoning some of the flexibilities in order to provide 
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Publication of the Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under 
TRIPS1 was a highly welcome event. The Max Planck Institute for Innovation and 
Competition had previously issued a copyright declaration—Declaration on a 
Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law.2 Written in the 
aftermath of two decisions by the Dispute Settlement Board (DSB) of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) interpreting the three-part exceptions provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement,3 the US-Section 110(5) decision on copyright and the Canada-
Pharmaceuticals decision on patents,4 Balanced Interpretation rightly criticized the 
110(5) decision for its narrow view of available flexibilities.5 As important, it 
suggested a new approach to the copyright exceptions test, one that would give 
member states more power to respond to the needs of local creators and their 
audiences.6 In so doing, however, the Copyright Declaration conveyed a negative 
pregnant: by taking on only the 110(5) decision, the Institute could be perceived as 
approving the way the Canada-Pharmaceuticals Panel interpreted the analogous 
patent provision.7 The Declaration on Patent Protection corrects the problem, for 
it nicely transposes the critique of the copyright decision into the patent context. 
The new Declaration also goes much further. It not only interprets the open-
ended provision on exceptions to patent rights, it also “seeks to clarify some of the 
regulatory options states still retain under international law.”8 This too is an 
important development. As César Rodríguez-Garavito and Rochelle Dreyfuss 
 
1. MAX PLANCK INST. FOR INNOVATION & COMPETITION, DECLARATION ON PATENT 
PROTECTION: REGULATORY SOVEREIGNTY UNDER TRIPS (2014) [hereinafter MAX PLANCK 
DECLARATION], https://www.mpg.de/8132986/Patent-Declaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MST-74 
NU]. 
2. Christophe Geiger et al., Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in 
Copyright Law, reprinted in 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707 (2008). 
3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, arts. 13, 30, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URURGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement]. 
4. Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. WT/ 
DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000); Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS160/R ( June 15, 2000). 
5. Geiger, et al., supra note 2, at 709. 
6. Id. at 710, 712. 
7. Id. at 709. 
8. MAX PLANCK DECLARATION, supra note 1. 
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found in their study of the impact of international intellectual property obligations 
on access to medicines in Latin America, many countries lack a firm understanding 
of how flexibly TRIPS can be read.9 The Declaration could help such nations find 
TRIPS-compatible ways to accommodate their interests in lowering the cost of, and 
increasing access to, the fruits of technological innovation. The Declaration could 
also be viewed as the first step in developing an international acquis on intellectual 
property—something that Dreyfuss and Graeme Dinwoodie have argued is crucial 
to providing nations implementing these flexibilities with the grounding necessary 
to withstand attacks on their laws, be it in WTO dispute settlement, in later rounds 
of TRIPS negotiations, or through proposals for so-called “TRIPS-plus” 
obligations in subsequent bilateral and regional free trade agreements.10 
Unfortunately, “could” is the operative word here. As we elaborate further 
below, the Declaration pushes the limits of TRIPS flexibilities so far, it loses 
credibility. As a result, countries following even its valid advice may not be able to 
use the Declaration effectively as a shield to later challenges. More critically, while 
the Declaration claims to provide a menu of “latitudes,”11 it fails to include a basis 
for picking and choosing among them. The implication is that a country could—
should—make use of them all. Combining all these minimalist provisions would, 
however, create a legal regime as bad for development as the maximalist notions 
championed by TRIPS-plus proponents. In a way, the two groups make opposing 
mistakes. Whereas advocates for strong international obligations tend to over-
estimate the extent to which developing countries can benefit from laws that 
promote innovation, the minimalist view does the opposite: it under-estimates the 
inventive capacity of developing countries. In the name of promoting access, it 
suggests that countries divest themselves of a core mechanism for incentivizing 
local innovation and promoting the investment necessary to facilitate it. What many 
developing countries actually need is a set of incentives that would encourage the 
local population to innovate for itself immediately and move toward the 
technological frontier over time. In addition to clarifying the options countries have 
to minimize protection, it would therefore be useful for the Declaration to provide 
these countries with guidance on how to combine options in a manner that would 
genuinely “maintain a proper balance between the need for protection of knowledge 
goods in global markets . . . and public interest goals.”12 
 
9. Rochelle Dreyfuss & César Rodriguez-Garavito, Conclusion: Balancing Wealth and Health in 
a Transnational Regulatory Framework, in BALANCING WEALTH AND HEALTH: THE BATTLE OVER 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN LATIN AMERICA 323, 324 (Rochelle 
Dreyfuss & César Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2014). 
10. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF 
TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 173–203 
(2012); see also Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural 
rights, U.N. Doc. A/70/279 (Aug. 4, 2015) (examining the relationship between human rights and 
patent rights). 
11. See MAX PLANCK DECLARATION, supra note 1, at 14. 
12. Id. at 2. 
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Once it is accepted that the goal for developing countries is not merely to gain 
access to foreign invention but to become innovative themselves, the question arises 
whether existing flexibilities offer the best options. To be sure, the Declaration does 
not purport to “think outside the box,” but it does imply that the best way to deal 
with the heterogeneity among WTO members is to capitalize on their sovereign 
authority. However, as Esteban Donoso has previously argued, the real problem 
with TRIPS is insufficient coordination.13 There is currently no mechanism that 
ensures that every country contributes a proportionate amount to the cost of 
developing the products from which it derives benefits.14 Nor is there a way for 
developed countries to prevent any products made available at lower prices in 
developing countries from finding their way to world markets and depressing global 
returns.15 As we will show, a better approach would be to allow states to alter the 
patent term to reflect their capacity to pay patent prices and to bar WTO members 
from recognizing a doctrine of international exhaustion (or, at least, limiting their 
options for considering right holder interests to be exhausted).16 The first step, if 
accompanied by a reduction in the use of many of the flexibilities minimalists 
suggest, would increase local incentives to innovate. At the same time, they would 
guarantee a fair return to all patent holders. By preventing policy spillovers, the 
second step would diminish the pressure to adopt TRIPS-plus obligations. As 
important, it would permit differential pricing and reduce global deadweight loss. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides examples of provisions in the 
Declaration that we believe exceed the flexibilities available in the TRIPS 
Agreement and thus cast doubt on its own integrity. Part II shows how countries 
could misunderstand the options set out in the Declaration and deprive their 
citizens of the incentives they need to meet even local innovation needs. Part III 
discusses Donoso’s novel proposals for better coordinating the global innovation 
enterprise. 
 
13. ESTEBAN DONOSO, A GLOBAL SOLUTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INVENTIONS 38 
(2013) [hereinafter DONOSO, GLOBAL SOLUTION]; see also Esteban Donoso, Application of a 
Mechanism of Proportional Rewards Towards Innovation, 4 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 105, 113 
(2014) [hereinafter Donoso, Proportional Rewards] (arguing that regulation with optimal impact occurs 
when three different aspects of TRIPS, validity, effectiveness and justice, all overlap). 
14. See Donoso, Proportional Rewards, supra note 13, at 106 (discussing the possibility of 
introducing a proportional reward system to the TRIPS Agreement where each country would 
contribute to technological development according to its economic capacity, seeing as no such system 
currently exists). 
15. Id. at 124–25. 
16. Currently, the TRIPS Agreement obliges all member states to protect inventions for twenty 
years. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 33. Apart from national treatment and most favoured nation 
concerns, it is agnostic on international exhaustion. Id. art. 6. Not surprisingly, the Declaration 
encourages countries to make more use of the latitude provided by Article 6. MAX PLANCK 
DECLARATION, supra note 1, § 5.1 at 14. 
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I. INTERPRETIVE PROBLEMS 
The Patent Declaration demonstrates the many ways in which a country can 
interpret the TRIPS Agreement to tailor its law to domestic conditions. We do not 
quarrel with the bulk of the recommendations. Countries have already implemented 
many of them and have done so to good effect. For example, the Declaration points 
out, “States have latitude to define what constitutes patentable inventions.”17 India 
has most famously used this option in § 3(d) of its Patent Act, which provides that 
the following is not eligible for protection: 
[T]he mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not 
result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the 
mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or 
of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such 
known process results in a new product or employs at least one new 
reactant.18 
The statute has worked well for India: because it does not allow patent holders to 
protect minor variations of a product whose patent is about to expire and then use 
the patent on the variation to bar access to the version that was originally marketed, 
the bar on patents for incremental innovation minimizes evergreening—the practice 
of extending the effective life of drugs by successively patenting minor variants of 
them.19 The provision has also meant that India’s highly developed generic drug 
industries can continue to make medicines like Novartis’s Gleevec, a treatment for 
leukemia that was developed from a known pharmaceutical formulation, available 
at low prices.20 
Should a country (such as Switzerland, home of Novartis) challenge § 3(d), the 
Declaration could be extremely helpful.21 Clearly, countries cannot consider all 
advances non-inventive or too obvious to be considered patentable. Accordingly, a 
DSB Panel confronting such a case would be required to draw a line between those 
advances that a country could, consistent with TRIPS, decide are not suitable for 
protection and those to which it must award patents.22 As Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss 
 
17. MAX PLANCK DECLARATION, supra note 1, § 3.1 at 14. 
18. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India). 
19. Other countries try to prevent evergreening in other ways. See, e.g., New York ex 
rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis, PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 654 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding coerced switching to a 
patented variant of a drug to be anticompetitive); Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 348 F.3d 992, 
993 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (barring patent on a precursor to a drug whose patent was expiring). India’s Patent 
Act, is, however, the most direct method of accomplishing this result. 
20. See Novartis Ag v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 1. 
21. See Trade Policy Review: India, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/M/313/Add.1, http://www.wto 
.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm; see also thiru, WTO Trade Policy Review of India: Section 
3(d) and Compulsory Licensing under the Spotlight, KNOWLEDGE & ECOLOGY INT’L (Aug. 3, 2015), 
http://keionline.org/node/2305 [https://perma.cc/7FM5-FFX6] (summarizing questions and 
answers by WTO members, and noting that Switzerland propounded questions concerning § 3(d) of 
India’s Patent Act as well as its use of compulsory licensing, and use of confidential test data). 
22. See DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 10, at 57 (discussing the DSB Panel’s process in 
adjudicating claims and referring to local authority). 
Dreyfuss & Donoso_Final to Printer (Do Not Delete) 5/29/2017 10:44 AM 
326 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:321 
suggest, the Panel may well approach the line-drawing problem by canvassing what 
other jurisdictions have done, and defer to India in the absence of consensus.23 
Unfortunately for India, however, there are many countries where drugs like 
Gleevec—new forms of old molecules—are protectable if they display (as Gleevec 
did) greater bioavailability or other improved properties.24 In such a case, the 
Declaration’s notion of latitude and its differentiation between discoveries and 
inventions25 could act as a tiebreaker. The Declaration is, after all, the considered 
opinion of an impressive array of specialists in intellectual property, competition, 
and international law, drawn from around the world. It was compiled over a period 
of several years, and in light of the TRIPS cases that had been decided up to its 
publication date.26 Given that the WTO adjudicators picked to hear such a challenge 
would not necessarily include anyone with a background in patent law, the 
Declaration could be extraordinarily helpful to the Panel (and to India). 
Additionally, the Declaration could become invaluable as investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) cases proliferate in the intellectual property arena.27 As Joost 
Pauwelyn demonstrated, the arbitrators in these disputes are drawn from circles 
unlikely to be appreciative of the need for sovereign flexibilities.28 
Whether the Declaration will function in this way depends, however, on its 
credibility—on whether it is perceived as thoughtful scholarship or as pure 
advocacy. Our concern is that some provisions push the line on flexibilities to the 
point where the Declaration is more likely to be viewed as the latter. 
Most glaringly, the provision on patent scope states, “Articles 27 and 28 of the 
TRIPS Agreement do not prevent states from limiting the protection conferred by 
a patent to products or processes in relation only to the specific function(s) of the 
invention expressly claimed in the patent.”29 Article 27, which requires protection 
for advances that are “new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application,”30 is not related to scope, so it is only marginally relevant to this 
question (more on this below). However, Article 28 delineates the required scope 
of protection. Significantly, it differentiates between product and process patents. 
For products, Article 28 requires that the patent confer the exclusive rights “to 
prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, 
offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product.”31 For 
 
23. Id. at 81. 
24. As the Indian Supreme Court noted, Gleevec was patented in the United States and under 
the European Patent Convention. Novartis Ag v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1, 90 ¶ 5 (India). See 
also Cynthia M. Ho, Should All Drugs Be Patentable?: A Comparative Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 295, 326–27 (2015). 
25. MAX PLANCK DECLARATION, supra note 1, at 5. 
26. For a list of contributors, see id. at 19. 
27. See Ho, supra note 24. 
28. Joost Pauwelyn, The Rule of Law without the Rule of Lawyers? Why Investment Arbitrators are 
from Mars, Trade Adjudicators are from Venus, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 761, 764, 798 (2015). 
29. MAX PLANCK DECLARATION, supra note 1, § 4 at 14. 
30. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 27.1. 
31. Id. art. 28.1(a). 
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processes, it requires that the patentee can “prevent third parties not having the 
owner’s consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, 
offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product 
obtained directly by that process.”32 
It is difficult to square the notion that a nation can limit product patents to 
the disclosed functions with the fact that TRIPS makes this differentiation, for a 
product patent that is limited to only particular functions is essentially a patent on 
the processes for achieving those functions. The best way to see this is to consider 
enforcement. The holder of a true product patent (that is, a patent that covers the 
product itself )  can monitor the market and sue anyone who appears to be making, 
using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the product without authorization. It is 
therefore relatively easy to stop unauthorized activity. The patentee must prove the 
defendant’s product falls within the claims of the patent; it might also face a 
challenge to validity, but—importantly—it is not forced to prove what use the 
defendant is making of the product. In contrast, the holder of a product patent of 
the type envisioned by the Declaration must prove that the product is being used 
for one of the specified functions. In other words, the patentee would have to prove 
exactly what the holder of a process patent must prove: that the defendant is actually 
using the patented information in a specific way. Where the end-users are 
consumers, and in countries that offer little discovery, holders of process patents 
have found it difficult, if not impossible, to sustain the burden of making that sort 
of showing.33 
Had TRIPS negotiators meant to require only this level of protection, they 
could have simply limited the patent obligation to the protection of processes. Or 
if they preferred to make distinctions, they might have eschewed the common 
terminology, which can be easily misunderstood, and instead required member 
nations to protect the right to make and the right to use (sometimes called 
“howtomake” and “howtouse” patents34). Presumably, they did not adopt either of 
these options because it is well recognized by innovation economists that process 
patents are much weaker than product patents.35 Process patents may be all that an 
inventor can obtain in certain circumstances and, in those cases, they may be better 
than no protection at all. But a system that relies on nothing but species of process 
 
32. Id. art. 28.1(b). 
33. Cf. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 206, 223 (1980) (holding it is 
not misuse to tie sales of a product to licensing the process for using it; noting the “practical difficulties” 
that patentees would otherwise encounter). 
34. See, e.g., Paul H. Eggert, Uses, New Uses and Chemical Patents—A Proposal, 51 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 768, 784–5 (1969); Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU 
L. REV. 1195, 1233–34 (2010) (noting that courts could provide separate claims for making and 
using a product without ever protecting the product itself ) . 
35. See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen & Steven Klepper, Firm Size and the Nature of Innovation Within 
Industries: The Case of Process and Product R&D, 78 REV. ECON. & STATS. 232, 233 (1996); Robert P. 
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 851 
(1990) (“because a product claim is typically broader than one simply on a particular way of making that 
product, patentees seek—and often obtain—product patents”). 
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patents is in danger of not allowing investors to appropriate enough of a return to 
incentivize the optimum level of inventive activity.36 
The patent system is also designed to encourage early patenting: all 
industrialized countries now award patents to the first to file an application.37 Even 
before the United States adopted that position in 2011,38 its law included a series of 
bars that pushed inventors to apply quickly.39 Early patenting discloses inventions 
before others have devoted resources to re-discovering them and it immediately 
exposes any new underlying principles to others. Further, as John Duffy has argued, 
the earlier a patent is applied for, the sooner the protected invention falls into the 
public domain.40 But if some countries were to limit product patents to the 
functions disclosed, they would undermine this system. It is not unusual to create a 
product for one purpose and then to find other applications.41 Under the 
Declaration’s approach, an inventor would tend to delay patenting until it 
discovered all the major functions of the product, for only then would it be able to 
recoup the full benefit of inventing it. Even if the inventor only cared to capture 
profits from one function, it might delay. After all, if new functions were found 
after the patent issued, the inventor would face the enforcement problem described 
above: it would be required to prove the defendant was using the product to 
perform the function described in the patent, not the one invented later. Because 
the world’s patent application processes are, in a sense, tied together through the 
priority rules of the Paris Convention,42 it is inconceivable that TRIPS negotiators 
would, without debate, have given countries “latitude” to adopt rules that encourage 
late patenting. 
Admittedly, the Europeans have taken the position that product patents can 
be limited to the disclosed function, but they have done so only in the case of gene 
patents. For example, German and French patent laws include provisions that gene 
 
36. See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery: The Empirical Case for Copyright and Patents, 
in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE 
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3, 20–21 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001). 
37. Michael A. Shinall, Priority and Disclosure: Challenges and Protections to Small Investors in a 
First-to-File World, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 362, 363 (2012). 
38. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
39. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), (d), (g) (amended 2012). 
40. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 444 (2004). 
41. See, e.g., Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015) (describing the widespread practice of using medications to treat conditions other than those for 
which the manufacturer sought FDA approval); Daniel S. Sem, Repurposing—Finding New Uses for Old 
(and Patented) Drugs: Bridging the “Valley of Death,” to Translate Academic Research into New Medicines, 
18 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 139 (2014); Repurposing Drugs, NAT’L CTR. FOR ADVANCING 
TRANSLATIONAL SCIS., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/research/reengineering/rescue-repurpose/rescue-
repurpose.html [https://perma.cc/EM5P-7PGA] (last updated Jan. 14, 2016). 
42. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 4, March 20, 1883, as 
last revised at Stockhold July 14, 1967, 13 U.S.T. 1. 
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patents cover only the function of the gene described in the specification.43 And the 
Court of Justice for the European Union has adopted a variation on the same theme, 
holding in Monsanto v. Cefetra that a product containing a protected gene is 
infringing only when the gene is functioning.44 
But these actions do not suggest the Declaration’s view of the scope of 
product patents is correct. First, this approach to gene patents has not been 
challenged in the WTO. Accordingly, there is nothing to say it is TRIPS compliant. 
Second, genes represent a very special case in that they have so many functions, 
giving patent holders rights over all of them would substantially impede scientific 
progress.45 In addition, genes do not disappear as products are altered. For example, 
the patented gene in a plant will still exist when the plant is harvested, turned into 
feed, and given to cows that are later made into hamburger. The Europeans may, in 
short, be making a category error: the difficulty with gene patents isn’t scope; it’s 
subject matter. Genes are fundamental building blocks of nature; they are not 
“inventions” and should not, in their pure form, be the subject of patents. 
That, indeed, is the position the United States Supreme Court took in AMP 
v. Myriad,46 where it held that genomic DNA (gDNA) is not patentable subject 
matter (but that complementary DNA (cDNA), which is synthesized, is patentable). 
The High Court of Australia went even further. In D’Arcy v. Myriad Genetics Inc.,47 
where the Court held both cDNA and gDNA unpatentable, the Justices concluded 
as follows: 
When proper regard is paid to their emphasis on genetic information, the 
subject matter of the claims lies at the boundaries of the concept of 
“manner of manufacture”. That it does lie at the boundaries is further 
evidenced by the odd consequence that if the claims are properly the 
subject of a patent, the patent could be infringed without the infringer 
being aware of that fact. That consequence coupled with the very large, 
indeed unquantified size of the relevant class of isolated nucleic acids, all 
of which bear the requisite information, raises the risk of a chilling effect 
upon legitimate innovative activity outside the formal boundaries of the 
monopoly and risks creating a penumbral de facto monopoly impeding the 
activities of legitimate improvers and inventors.48 
In defense of what they have done, the Europeans might argue that because 
they could have excluded gene patents entirely, they are free to grant limited 
protection. That argument hinges on whether genes can be excluded from patenting 
 
43. Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie über den rechtlichen Schutz biotechnologischer 
Erfindungen [Statute Implementing the European Council’s Biotechnology Directive], Jan. 21, 2005, 
BGBL I at 146, § 1a (4) (Ger.); CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE art. L613-2-1 (Fr.). 
44. Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, 2010 E.C.R. 7. 
45. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption, Inventing 
Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1350 (2011). 
46. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2109 (2013). 
47. D’Arcy v Myriad Genetic Inc. [2015] HCA 35 (Austl.). 
48. Id. ¶ 93. 
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under Article 27 (i.e., on whether the Myriad cases are compatible with TRIPS)—
perhaps that is why the Declaration included Article 27 in its statement about scope. 
But this argument works only in cases where a product could be excluded entirely. 
It would permit the exclusion of other natural phenomena and, per the Australian 
case, perhaps other technological platforms, such as basic molecular shapes (for 
example, buckminsterfullerenes or carbon nanotubes) and metabolic pathways, 
where patenting might similarly chill “legitimate innovative activity outside the 
formal boundaries of the monopoly.”49 But it does not support the general claim 
made in the Declaration that all product patents can be limited to the declared 
function. And even then, there is a question. TRIPS permits outright exclusion of 
advances that are not “inventions,” but it does not state whether a country can take 
action less drastic than outright exclusion. While a reading that allows countries to 
adopt less radical options gives states more tools for tailoring law to their needs, 
Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss note that strong arguments can be made that the TRIPS 
Agreement should be read as putting states’ feet to the fire. That is, if they decide a 
field presents a special problem, they must be willing to accept the political 
repercussions of entirely excluding that field from patenting.50 
While the rule on scope provides the most obvious clue that the Declaration 
is somewhat less than balanced scholarship, other elements also undermine its 
credibility. Basic rules of evidence refrain from putting the burden on a litigant to 
prove the absence of a fact. Yet the recommendations on compulsory licensing 
instruct states that they can shift to the patentee the burden of proving the 
nonexistence of the conditions said to require a license.51 In apparent contradiction 
to Article 31(g) of TRIPS, the Declaration takes the position that once awarded, a 
compulsory license can continue even if the circumstances for it have ended.52 
There is also convoluted language that may mean the states need not consider the 
effect of such licenses on investment in innovation.53 Furthermore, the Declaration 
claims that the government can use patents without authorization for any 
purpose—presumably, including entirely private purposes for profit.54 The 
measures on undisclosed information draw a distinction between “disclosing” 
undisclosed information and “relying” on undisclosed information.55 While it is 
technically correct that these are two different actions, the history of Article 39.3 of 
TRIPS on trade secrets belies the notion that the provision was meant to permit 
generic drug companies to rely on the safety and efficacy information another firm 
 
49. Cf. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(invalidating claims essentially drawn to the operation of the NF-κB metabolic pathway on the ground 
that the patent failed to provide an adequate written description of the invention). 
50. DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 10, § 7.4 at 68–69. 
51. MAX PLANCK DECLARATION, supra note 1, § 7.4 at 16. 
52. Id. § 7.5 at 16. 
53. Id. (“Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement does not require the limitation of a compulsory 
licence to a degree that would unduly impede reasonable and good-faith investments of the licensee.”). 
54. Id. §§ 8.1–8.2 at 16. 
55. Id. at 11, 17. 
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generated at great expense as long as the generics have not been granted the ability 
to physically view it.56 
II. INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE 
Even if the Declaration was correct in its interpretation of individual 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, it does less to “clarify regulatory options” than 
it might. The thrust of the document is that states can strike the appropriate balance 
by adopting all of the options the Declaration sets out. But that is true only if a state 
has absolutely no ambition to be inventive in its own right. Perhaps such states exist. 
Certainly, there are nations that are so lacking in universities, trained workers, 
laboratories, or even laws that facilitate the accumulation of capital or risk-taking 
that they are unlikely to reach the global technological frontier in the near future. 
Many states can, however, still invent in ways that can make important social 
contributions. Demand within the local market can encourage the establishment of 
a creative sector. Furthermore, successful early efforts to innovate for local 
consumption can lead to the development of needed infrastructure and, eventually, 
to the ability to generate innovations that appeal to broader markets. The copyright 
industries have already seen this progression (witness Bollywood) and with a 
judiciously crafted patent system, the same could easily happen on the technology 
side. 
A truly minimalist approach of the type implied by the Declaration could, 
however, significantly hamper progress of this sort. Reconsider the first two 
examples set out in the previous section: the recommendation to refuse protection 
for incremental advances, such as finding a second use for a known product, and 
to limit patent protection on products to the functions disclosed in the specification. 
On its own, either option would provide a modicum of protection. Thus, in a 
country that denies patents on second uses but adopts the usual approach product 
patents, a second (sequential) use—if found during the period when the initial 
product is patented—will be protected by that patent.57 If the second use is found 
by the holder of the product patent, the holder can capture the return on the new 
use for the remainder of the patent term on the original invention.58 If the second 
use is found by someone else, the two inventors can enter into a contractual 
arrangement to share in the profits generated by the new function. Arguably, they 
 
56. See, e.g., Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in 
International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data Under the TRIPs Agreement, 45 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 443, 447 (2004); G. Lee Skillington & Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and Other Data 
Required by Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 15–22, 35 n.102 (2003). 
57. See, e.g., Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential 
Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 20 (1995) (analyzing the complex relationship between the original and 
sequential innovator); see also Bhaven N. Sampat & Kenneth C. Shadlin, TRIPS Implementation and 
Secondary Pharmaceutical Patenting in Brazil and India, 50 STUD. COMP, INT’L DEV. 228 (2015) 
(showing that the impact of § 3(d) would not have been as disastrous had India protected product 
patents when the original molecule was invented). 
58. See Green & Scotchmer, supra note 57, at 21. 
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will allocate them in accordance with the relative value of the two uses. If the second 
inventor gets a patent of its own and refuses to license, states can adopt the 
provision in TRIPS permitting them to grant compulsory licenses in the case of 
blocking patents.59 Again, the license fee would presumably reflect the added value 
of the second use. Alternatively, if the country adopts the Declaration’s theory that 
a product patent covers only the disclosed function, but permits second use patents, 
then the patent on the first use protects the first inventor and the patent on the new 
use will permit the sequential inventor to capture a return on that invention. (There 
will be no blocking as the first patent would not extend to the second use). 
But what if a country adopts both pieces of the Declaration’s advice? The 
second use would not be covered by the first patent because it would not have been 
disclosed in the application. And it could not be covered by a new patent because 
such patents are barred. Yet incremental innovation is extremely important. In the 
pharmaceutical field, for instance, many significant therapies are found during the 
course of treating patients for other illnesses.60 More generally, one reason 
disclosure is a crucial element of the patent regime (and experimental use provisions 
are important) is so that others can find applications the first inventor did not 
consider.61 Perfecting these new advances can nonetheless be expensive. 
Accordingly, they too can require a system that encourages investment. 
For developing countries, there is arguably a special reason to preserve a 
means for protecting incremental innovation, for many inventions require 
modification to local conditions. Seed companies, for example, may not optimize 
for soil and climate conditions in countries that do not farm on a commercial scale;62 
pharmaceuticals are not always developed to deal with the absence of refrigeration;63 
mechanical inventors may invent under the assumption that customers will enjoy a 
source of continuous energy. As David Opderbeck argued in the context of 
pharmaceuticals, firms in countries at the cusp of development, free from the 
expectation that they introduce “blockbuster” products, are particularly well 
situated to identify, and invent for, such niche markets.64 Countries may thus be 
better off with a patent system that encourages adaptations of important 
breakthroughs to domestic needs than with one that reserves protection to the sort 
of leaps its own residents are unlikely to make. Whether it is better to adopt law that 
 
59. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 31(l). 
60. See Sem, supra note 41, at 139. 
61. See, e.g., Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005) (recognizing 
the importance of research on known compounds). See generally, Merges & Nelson, supra note 35, at 
845–48, 883. 
62. See, e.g., Ronald J. Herring, Stealth Seeds: Bioproperty, Biosafety, Biopolitics, 43 J. DEV. STUD. 
130, 134 (2007). 
63. See generally Brahmaiah Kommanaboyina & C. T. Rhodes, Trends in Stability Testing, 
with Emphasis on Stability During Distribution and Storage, Drug Development and Industrial 
Pharmacy, 25 DRUG DEV. & INDUS. PHARMACY 857, 864 (1999) (discussing the stability of 
pharmaceuticals in a variety of conditions). 
64. David W. Opderbeck, Patents, Essential Medicines, and the Innovation Game, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 501, 522 (2005). 
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frees second uses from patenting but permits patents on products, or vice versa, is 
a hard question and guidance would be helpful. 
The Declaration raises many other issues of this sort. Is the approach it sets 
out for compulsory licensing the best way to encourage anyone (locals or foreigners) 
to develop the products for which a developing country might have a unique need? 
What of an open-ended provision on government use by for-profit subcontractors? 
Or the discretion to deny injunctive relief if “the legitimate interests of parties may 
be adversely affected” or if the injunction is “contrary to the public interest”?65 As 
Alan Sykes has argued in the case of pharmaceutical research, the dearth of research 
in diseases of particular importance to developing countries may well come from 
the excessive willingness of developing countries to use exceptions, limitations, and 
flexibilities.66 Ironically, the result of using these exceptions is that the more 
important and needed an innovation, the more likely exceptions and limitations will 
apply and the patent holder will be stripped of its ability to fully recoup costs. Such 
a situation can only discourage investors, both local and international, and 
exacerbate the problem nonmarket economies face in motivating research geared 
to their needs. 
If the Declaration is truly aimed at clarifying options within the current 
framework, then it could do better than to set out minimalist options with no 
indications of their disadvantages, little guidance on which combinations work best 
and which are to be avoided, and no advice on what sorts of outside interests are 
“legitimate” or, in the long term, “contrary to the public interest.” Indeed, if the 
ultimate goal is to make the system better as a whole, the Institute’s approach can 
also be criticized for missing the big picture.67 The entire thrust of the Declaration 
is to promote sovereign authority—to give nations the power to promote their own 
parochial objectives. But enhancing the autonomy of each country to design its own 
patent system fails to consider the value of coordination, of building a patent system 
that takes into account the needs and capabilities of the entire globe. We next turn 
to an approach that introduces a concept of proportionality as a substitute for the 
Declaration’s vigorous support for sovereignty. In our view, global regulations 
aimed at coordinating the international innovation system would be better at 
drawing out innovation that increases consumer welfare, it would be more equitable, 
and it would increase economic efficiency. 
III. CREATING A BETTER BALANCE 
The two Declarations are not the Max Planck Institute’s only forays into the 
debate over regulatory sovereignty under the TRIPS Agreement. In another 
 
65. MAX PLANCK DECLARATION, supra note 1, § 10.1 at 17 (emphasis added). 
66. Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 65–66 (2002). 
67. See Annette Kur, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A FAIR WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF 
TRIPS 455, 526–27 (Annette Kur & Marianne Levin eds. 2011). 
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initiative, the Institute participated in a project suggesting modifications to TRIPS 
that would go beyond the clarification of existing options to expand the 
Agreement’s latitudes.68 While we are sympathetic to the objectives of all of these 
efforts, we suggest that it is time to contemplate a more transcendent reform. In its 
essence, international lawmaking is intended to facilitate coordination among 
national systems. Rather than fight this goal by identifying loopholes that can be 
exploited to maximize sovereign authority, it is worth considering steps to deepen 
the degree of coordination. In this section, we demonstrate how a global perspective 
on two issues—the obligation to adopt a twenty-year term of protection and 
international exhaustion69—would promote innovation on a worldwide scale and, 
at the same time, strike the appropriate balance among generations of innovators, 
between innovators and consumers, and take account of both developing and 
developed countries’ views and aspirations. 
A. Term of Protection 
The TRIPS Agreement requires all WTO members to adopt a twenty-year 
patent term for all technologies.70 This is an easily administered system. However, 
it leaves countries with only standards on the availability of patents (issues such as 
the subject matter of protection or the height of the inventive step) and the breadth 
of protection (exceptions, compulsory licenses, government use rights, and the like) 
to use as tools for balancing competing interests.71 These are the techniques the 
Declaration advocates, but as we saw, their use lowers domestic incentives to 
innovate, including especially incentives to meet needs that foreigners are unlikely 
to identify or fulfill. Even the threat that a compulsory license might issue or that a 
judge will find that an injunction may affect a legitimate interest or impinge on an 
ill-defined concept of social welfare can scare potential investors and prevent them 
from transferring technology to a developing country or devoting resources to its 
technology sector. As important, use of these flexibilities gives the impression of 
shirking: that countries that use them are free riding and not paying their fair share 
of the costs of development. That perception, in turn, leads developed countries to 
demand the elimination of the flexibilities—that is, to argue over how TRIPS should 
be interpreted and to negotiate TRIPS-plus agreements. To developing countries, 
however, these actions are viewed as attempts to force them to forego use of 
inventions that would improve social welfare or to require them to pay foreigners 
 
68. Id. At 526–27. 
69. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 6, 33. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. art. 27–34. 
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for advances that would, in all likelihood, have been invented anyway.72 In the end, 
both sides see the agreements as unfair.73 
But economists have long understood that the term of the patent can be used 
in much the same way as patent breadth to balance competing interests and calibrate 
the patent reward.74 Typically, their arguments concern differences in technological 
fields and lead to recommendations to vary the length of the term to accommodate 
factors such as the cost of research in each field, the social value of invention within 
that sector, and characteristics of the demand function.75 The proposals are then 
routinely rejected because lawyers consider them impossible to administer. It would 
be difficult to calculate the optimum term for each technology, to update the 
calculation as fields mature, or to deter skilled patent prosecutors from drafting 
around the categories to obtain longer terms for their clients. 
However, as Donoso has argued, the length variable could be used on a 
geographic basis to achieve a much-sought balance.76 Instead of imposing on all 
WTO members a minimum term of twenty years, the TRIPS Agreement could 
require protection for a term that the WTO would calculate on the basis of each 
country’s wealth.77 This single change could turn everything around. Developing 
countries would contribute to the overall global effort to innovate according to their 
individual capacities to pay. They would thus no longer find it imperative to use 
flexibilities, exceptions, and limitations, which reduce their contributions and 
diminish investments in innovation, but are perceived as necessary to address the 
unbalanced nature of the basic regime.78 If wealth were used to calculate the 
required patent term, developing countries might, in fact, become pro-protection, 
as they would then carry the same burden, measured in proportion to their 
affluence, as would a developed country. 
This approach would be easy to administer: the country of registration is 
immutable and the term would be set according to an objective criterion, such as 
 
72. See, e.g., Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How 
International Law is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 557, 575 (2015) (claiming 
that FTAs can be seen as requiring countries to bring laws into closer harmony, i.e., granting greater 
patent protection in more developed countries to their detriment). 
73. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom of 
Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 71 (2011); Susan K. Sell, TRIPS 
Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447, 453 
(2011). 
74. See, e.g., Amir H. Khoury, Differential Patent Terms and the Commercial Capacity to Innovate, 
18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 373, 374–75 (2010); Ted O’Donoghue et al., Patent Breadth, Patent Life, 
and the Pace of Technological Progress, 7 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1, 2 (1998). 
75. William D. Nordhaus, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL 
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969). For a literature review, see Khoury, supra note 
74, at 393–97. 
76. DONOSO, GLOBAL SOLUTION, supra note 13, at 9; Donoso, Proportional Rewards, supra note 
13, at 115. 
77. See Donoso, Proportional Rewards, supra note 13, at 125–30 (providing an example of what 
such a formula might look like). 
78. Id. at 125–26, 131–34. 
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gross domestic product. Under this system, a country suffering from a bad economy 
would be allowed to establish a shorter term of protection. But once its economic 
problems are solved, conditions improve, and it is in a position to contribute more 
to the technological progress of humanity, it would be required to extend the 
exclusivity period for future inventions.79 As with the current TRIPS Agreement, 
the WTO-calculated term would represent the minimum required; countries could 
choose to adopt a longer period of protection, either across the board or for special 
cases, such as for pharmaceutical inventions, in order to ensure that inventors 
receive adequate remuneration.80 
Varying the patent term could be coupled with other obligations. For example, 
a country that is allowed a shorter term could be required to forego other 
flexibilities, such as compulsory licensing in all but the most dire circumstances.81 
The approach would have many advantages. A term certain, coupled with a reduced 
threat of losing exclusivity unpredictably, would furnish firmer grounds for 
investment. With greater certainty, local innovators would enjoy an incentive to 
engage in the sort of incremental innovation that their countries particularly need 
and that they are uniquely capable of providing. The system would also better 
motivate foreign inventors to invest locally and to engage in research on problems 
that are especially prevalent in developing nations. And the approach would 
decrease deadweight loss, for consumers who cannot afford to pay 
supracompetitive prices would have access to inventions sooner. 
For nations that are having trouble identifying flexibilities, or implementing 
them into law (or on the ground) effectively,82 the option of adopting a shorter term 
would be an especial boon. The rule would be easy to implement and, if used instead 
of complicated modifications of patentability standards, would allow these 
countries to rely more on foreign examinations and permit their patent offices to 
join efforts, such as the patent prosecution highway, that lower the costs of 
administering the patent system.83 Further, it would eliminate much of the need for 
local post-grant challenges or for second looks by other government agencies.84 
 
79. See DONOSO, GLOBAL SOLUTION, supra note 13, at 92 (discussing in detail the frequency 
and effect of revising the term length and the positive implications that can be derived from applying a 
variable factor). 
80. See, e.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271); Council Regulation 1768/92, 
1992 O.J. (L 182) (EC) 1 (concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for 
medicinal products). 
81. Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., art. 17.9(7), May 18, 2004, 43 
I.L.M. 1248 (permitting compulsory licensing only to prevent anticompetitive conduct and in the case 
of national emergency or extreme urgency) [hereinafter AUSFTA]. 
82. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS 
Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1574 (2009) (noting that the 
patent office in India lacks the resources to apply § 3(d) properly). 
83. Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH)—Fast Track Examination of Applications, USPTO (Feb. 
20, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/international-protection/patent-prosecution-
highway-pph-fast-track [https://perma.cc/PQ83-XRNA]. 
84. See, e.g., Lei No. 10.196, de 14 de Fevereiro de 2001, Col. Leis Rep. Fed. Brasil, 62, 
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This approach would also reduce the need for complex judicial determinations in 
the remedial stage of enforcement actions or in connection with applications for 
compulsory licenses. 
But the major difference lies in the global impact of this approach. For 
inventions that are of equal interest to people all over the world, there would no 
longer be reason to think that developing countries are free riding or that the 
imposition of supracompetive pricing is unjust. A regime that calibrated the term 
by reference to a measure of national wealth would, essentially, require countries to 
contribute to the cost of innovations that they use, in an amount (roughly) 
proportionate to their economic capacity to pay. The burden of supporting 
scientific advancement and technological development would, in short, be felt 
equally in all countries regardless of their state of economic development. 
Suspicions of free riding (on the one hand) and profiteering (on the other) might 
then abate. With a tool that equalizes the burden, the members of the WTO might 
also be willing to revive the negotiations that have been stalled for over a decade. 
B. Exhaustion 
All of the ideas discussed so far—clarifying the existing agreement, tweaking 
the current system, or (more dramatically) changing the patent term—suffer from 
one problem: countries that make money from their inventive capacity will not agree 
to any of these approaches because there is no coordination on the question of 
international exhaustion. Under the current TRIPS regime, as long as countries 
abide by their national treatment and most favoured nation obligations, they can, in 
the Patent Declaration’s words, determine “whether patent rights are to be 
exhausted nationally, regionally, or internationally.”85 As a result, once the patent 
holder makes embodiments of its invention available in any one country, other 
countries are free to “parallel import” them to their own territory, where they can 
then be sold or used without further authorization (or further payment), even in the 
face of large global price differentials. 
Indeed, the Declaration doubles down and encourages states to use this 
flexibility.86 Thus, it points out that: 
Some industries may be more prone to parallel imports than others; and 
some may depend more on price differentiation than others. States remain 
free to apply the concept of exhaustion that they expect to be most 
favourable for the development of the industry in the field of technology 
concerned.87 
 
Fevereiro 2001 (Braz.) (requiring the National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) to review patent 
awards to ensure that they will not endanger public health). 
85. MAX PLANCK DECLARATION, supra note 1, § 5.1 at 14; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, 
art. 6. 
86. MAX PLANCK DECLARATION, supra note 1, § 5.2 at 14. 
87. Id. at 7. 
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To be sure, the relationship between Article 27’s principle of nondiscrimination by 
field of technology and Article 6’s agnosticism regarding exhaustion presents a 
difficult question. Article 27’s ban on discrimination by field of technology 
forestalls special-pleading lobbying and thus ensures that all inventors receive 
equivalent opportunities to appropriate returns from their inventive efforts. Because 
parallel importation can undermine the rewards a right holder can obtain in any 
particular jurisdiction as surely as can any other flexibility a country might adopt, 
the ban should, in theory, apply there as well. However, Article 6 specifically states 
that as far as exhaustion is concerned, only issues related to the national treatment 
and most favoured nation obligations are subject to dispute resolution.88 It is 
therefore likely that WTO members can recognize international exhaustion for 
some industries and not for others without fear of a TRIPS challenge in the DSB.89 
The harder question is whether encouraging international exhaustion 
promotes the values of international intellectual property law (or even the 
Declaration’s goal of increasing regulatory sovereignty). Arguably, it does the 
opposite. International exhaustion, coupled with cheap transportation costs and 
dramatic increases in global trade, can make countries hypersensitive to externalities 
generated by their trading partners.90 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.91 furnishes 
a good example. The case involved a claim that the importation of cheap textbooks 
from Thailand into the United States infringed the publisher’s copyrights. After the 
Supreme Court recognized a doctrine of international exhaustion in U.S. copyright 
law, thereby allowing importation of the texts, Wiley announced it would increase 
the price of the international editions of its books.92 Access for Thai students will 
thus decrease, even as the books become cheaper for already-privileged Americans. 
To make matters worse, TRIPS’s failure to coordinate rules on parallel 
importation means that countries like Thailand have no control over whether 
 
88. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 6. 
89. Whether such action would be subject to challenge under other provisions of the GATT is 
a different question and beyond the scope of this article. 
90. International intellectual property law recognizes this point in at least two places. The 
Appendix to the Berne Convention allows developing nations special rights over translations—but only 
into languages that are unpopular. An Appendix to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works, App. Arts. II, III, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised July 24, 1971, amended Oct. 2, 1979, 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. Translation into languages that would attract exportation 
of cheap copies into major markets are highly disfavoured. See id. art. II(2). Similarly, while the Doha 
Declaration on Public Health recognized the need to modify art. 31(f) of TRIPS to allow countries to 
issue compulsory licenses to meet certain special needs of foreign markets, implementation introduced 
conditions intended to prevent leakage of cheap products into markets that can afford to pay patent 
prices, see WTO, Implementation of Paragraph 11 of the General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 
on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, Dec. 6, 2005, IP/C/41, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news05_e/trips_decision_ 
e.doc. 
91. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1357 (2013). 
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countries like the United States recognize international exhaustion and allow 
importers to roam the world for the best deals on protected works. Nor can one 
nation control the conditions under which other countries permit parallel imports—
for instance, whether they permit them only when right holders voluntarily put 
goods on the market at prices they set themselves, or also allow it when threats of 
compulsory licenses, government takeover, or price controls coerce right holders 
into selling at reduced prices. And while TRIPS can certainly be interpreted to 
require right holders to affirmatively exercise their right to exclude (presumably, 
that is why the concept is referred to as “exhaustion”), arguments have been made 
that anytime goods are lawfully on the market (for example, through the use of 
compulsory licenses or in the absence of a local patent), parallel importation is 
permissible.93 
To put the point more generally, a key reason for international intellectual 
property law is to prevent each country’s intellectual property policies from spilling 
over outside its borders and affecting the way other nations have balanced the 
interests of domestic users and producers. Rules permitting parallel importation 
violate that principle by creating extremely interdependent markets. Accordingly, 
they encourage countries that see high levels of protection as desirable locally to 
inflict that view on nations where less protection is more appropriate. For example, 
because TRIPS takes no position on price controls, countries enjoy substantial 
leeway to ameliorate the effect of patents on important products, such as 
pharmaceuticals. But the availability of low-price medication on world markets has 
led the United States to negotiate new free trade agreements that limit governmental 
authority over price setting.94 Similarly, the United States has sought to cabin 
exclusions from protection95 and compulsory licensing.96 Indeed, its strident 
position on data exclusivity may stem less from the desire to earn high profits in 
places like Central America and more from the fear that cheap drugs will become 
available for export.97 
An international rule on parallel importation would be helpful if it did no more 
than add a definition of exhaustion to Article 6. For example, the Agreement could 
make it clear that the patent holder cannot be regarded as having exhausted its 
 
93. See Christopher Heath, Exhaustion and Patent Rights, in PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 419, 463 (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A. Bagley eds., 2014). 
94. See e.g., United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Kor., art. 5.3(1)–(2), June 30, 
2007, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text [hereinafter 
KORUS]. In a Confirmation Letter, Korea also agreed to ensure that the body setting prices be 
independent of the health authorities. The United States also uses trade preferences to pressure 
countries over their methods of controlling price. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
2015 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 25, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2015-Special-301-Report-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/53SB-Q2HS] (commenting on New Zealand’s Pharmaceutical 
Management Agency (PhARMAC)). 
95. See, e.g., KORUS, supra note 94, art. 18.8(2). 
96. See, e.g., AUSFTA, supra note 81, art. 17.9(7). 
97. See, e.g., Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement art. 15.10, Aug. 5, 
2004, 43 I.L.M. 514. 
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interests unless it voluntarily allowed its goods to be sold (and then, perhaps, only 
if the price was not influenced by governmental action or threats of such action). 
But a complete bar on parallel importation would be most efficient economically, 
for it would allow the right holder to squeeze out deadweight loss. Or as Sykes put 
it: 
If trading nations as a whole ban parallel imports, pharmaceutical patent 
holders should be willing to sell their products at a low price to nations 
where customers cannot afford to pay much for them as long as that price 
covers the marginal cost of making the drug and delivering it. They will be 
willing to do so because each sale yields some profit, and they need not 
fear that their low-priced sales in one market will be re-exported to 
undercut their prices elsewhere.98 
Sykes was speaking of pharmaceutical products, but his conclusion applies to 
all patented inventions. Because segmenting markets prevents externalization of the 
costs of each country’s policies, there would be less reason to be concerned about 
how individual nations balance intellectual property rights against other interests. A 
coordinated international exhaustion system would thus make the Declaration’s 
other recommendations considerably more palatable and it would also allow 
countries to freely experiment with intellectual property protection in ways the 
Declaration did not anticipate. Moreover, it might reduce the pressures currently 
placed on developing countries to enter into new agreements that further reduce 
access for their consumers and for follow-on inventors. 
A rule that bars international exhaustion would also further the goals of the 
proportionate-return system discussed above. Strictly speaking, a complete bar is 
not a prerequisite to the proposal for varying the patent term according to national 
wealth.99 As long as exhaustion is properly defined, a patentee could avoid losing 
global profits by withdrawing from markets in countries with shorter terms once its 
patents in those countries have expired. Admittedly, at that point, third parties could 
enter the market. However, the patentee could rely on Article 28’s exclusive right 
of importation to require countries where the patent remains in force to prevent 
those parties from selling goods in their territories. Nevertheless, a bar on parallel 
imports would work better. Patentees who leave markets forego the possibility of 
earning a competitive return. With lower prospective profits, the patentee may be 
unwilling to make the investments necessary to enter in the market in first place 
(especially, as with pharmaceuticals, where the cost of entry is high). An 
international rule on exhaustion would thus not only ensure each country shoulders 
a burden of the cost of development, it would also make it more likely that patentees 
will be willing to exploit these markets and make their inventions available to those 
who live in places where the term is less than twenty years. 
 
98. Sykes, supra note 66, at 64. 
99. See DONOSO, GLOBAL SOLUTION, supra note 13, at 99–100; Donoso, Proportional Rewards, 
supra note 13, at 120, 124–25. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Max Planck Declaration is a noble effort to clarify national options under 
the TRIPS Agreement. In a sense, however, it is too noble an effort. Its aggressive 
interpretation of certain of the Agreement’s provisions undermines the credibility 
of the enterprise as a whole. Moreover, if adopted in toto, the Declaration would 
extinguish local incentives to invent and undermine the effort to move all nations 
to the technological frontier, where they can become innovative in their own right. 
More reasonable positions, explained in greater detail, would be far more useful. 
In the final analysis, however, it is not clear whether the problem with TRIPS 
is, as the Declaration implies, too little sovereign authority, or whether the trouble 
is insufficient coordination. The TRIPS Agreement eschews use of the patent term 
to balance competing interests. Were the WTO to focus on that variable and 
calculate the minimum term based on each nation’s ability to pay, the system would 
more fairly distribute the burden of contributing to the advancement of knowledge. 
When coupled with a ban on parallel importation, such a regime would also be more 
efficient economically, for it would lower worldwide examination costs, permit 
discriminatory pricing, and eliminate deadweight loss. It would also encourage 
global compliance and reduce pressure for inappropriate levels of top-down 
harmonization. Both developed and developing countries’ interests will be satisfied 
and, more importantly, a better and balanced system will be created. More 
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